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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
l\IARVIN JOE REEVES,
-vs-

Plaintiff-Appellant,

JOHN W. TURNER, \Varden Utah
State Prison,

Case No.
12710

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEl\'lENT OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from a decision denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition was
denied in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Honorable James S. Sawaya,
.Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied.
ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower
court be affirmed.

2

OF THR FACTS
Respondent substantially adopts the Statement of
Facts as found in appellant's brief, along with the following additions and corrections:
In l\larch, 1963, appellant pleaded guilty to second
degree burglary and was sentenced to one to twenty
years imprisonment. He was paroled :May 25, 1965. On
February 14, HW7, appellant was convicted of grand
larceny and sentenced to one to ten years. Pursuant to
the grand larceny conviction, his parole was revoked on
.March 8, 1967. Appellant was granted a parole a second
time on March 18, 1969, (R-1) at which time he signed
a parole agreement. In July, 1970, appellant failed to
file his monthly report. ( T. 8) .
.l\lost of the following facts are taken from the
transcript of the hearing on parole violation on l\Ianin
J. Reeves on September 9, 1970, which was stipulated
into evidence. ( T. 2).
Uecause appellant's July report was not filed, Mr.
Tingey, appellant's parole officer, went to appellant's
home where his mother told him that he was not at home
and had not been seen for several weeks. Appellant's
whereabouts were not known until July 13, when Agent
Saunders received a phone call from Dorothy Jackson,
appellant's mother-'in-law. Appellant was in Los Angelos
involved with drugs and had been bothering and harassing his wife. l\Irs. Jackson was concerned for the sake
of her daughter and the children's safety. Mrs. Jack-
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son contacted Detective Gibbs of the Ogden Police
Department who then relayed the information on to Mr.
Boyington,
Tingey's supervisor. l\'Ir. Boyington
authorized appellant to be picked up because he was
out of state without permission and because he had not
submitted his July report.
At 8:10 P.M., on July 14, 1970, Officer Ashton
met appellant at Gate 3, Ij,light 6, of the Salt Lake
Airport, on the Western Airlines flight from California. The officer's knowledge of the proper port of
arrival indicates that there was substantial knowledge
that appellant was indeed out of the state. Officer Ashton called appellant by name and asked him to stop
because he wanted to talk to him. Appellant was apprehen<led and given a Miranda warning. He was found
to be carrying tin-fold type paper and two ballons which
contained a brown powder substance which appeared
to he heroin. Appelant was then arrested on parole violation on condition of a narcotic drug.
Appellant's parole was revoked on the grounds
that he had not submitted a July report, he had left the
state without permission, and he had heroin on his person
when he returned from California. At the parole violations hearing in the Utah State Prison on September
9, 1971, appellant was reimprisoned. The District Court
then reviewed the proceedings and found that appellant's incarceration was not in any form contrary to
law. (R. 9).

ARG
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
\VEllE NOT VIOLATED 'VlIEN AF AIR AND
11\IP .ARTIAL HEARING RESULTED IN HIS
PAROLE REVOCATION.
A parolee is a convicted prisoner who's status does
not change; he is merely allowed more freedom as a
matter of grace and priveledgc and not a matter of
right. See 1llcCo.1J t'. II arris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d
721 ( 1945); Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-17 ( 1953);
People v. Denne 297 P.2d 451 (Cal. App. 1956). A
parolee is still in legal custody. See Pco plc v. Lewis, 287
N.Y. 478, 41N.E.2d62 (1942). This custody is continuous and subject to being reduced to actual custody.
See People v. Santos, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1969).

The United States Supjreme Court has
their position by saying that the revocation of parole is no part of a criminal prosecution in
which the defendant is entitled his full panoply of rights.
1llorrisscy t'. H rc·wcl', 11 Cr .L. 332·J. (June 29, 1972).
See also People t'. Santos, supra. A recent 10th Circuit
case from the District of Utah stated that a threat to the
status of parole does not i1wofre constitutional rights.
See Sweeten v. Sneddon, U.S. District Court for
District Court for District of Utah, Northern Divisioun, docket number 71-1275 (10th Cir. July 7, 1972) ·
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The specifics of due process are not required in
parole revocation hearings and in reviewing such hearings the court's function is only to insure that general
standards of fairness are met. See 1llurphy v. Turner,
42G F.2cl 422 (10th Cir. 1970) ; Baine v. Beckstead,
10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2<l 554 (1959). While the parole
board has broad discretion, the hearing must be fair
and free from caprice See Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.2d
214 (10th Cir. uno); Brown v. 1Varden, U.S. Penitentiary, 351 F.2d 564, (7th Cir. 1965).
This court in Baine v. Bcclt'sfead, supra, held that
in the absence of a record showing what happened upon
revocation of probation, " ... it must be assumed that
the proceeding established a sufficient basis to justify
the order of the court. In attacking it, the burden was
upon the defendant to affirmatively show error, failing
wh;ch the action of the trial court is deemed to be correct." Id at 11. In the present case, appellant did receive
a fair and impartial hearing in conformity with his
constitutional rights.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S ARREST
LEGAL OR UNLA,V"FUL.

WAS

NOT

IL-

Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 ( 1953), states that
one of the ways an officer may obtain sufficient warrant for the arrest of a parolee is by a written order
certified by the secretary of the Board of Pardons.
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The lower court held that a written certified order is
certainly not the "only" means by which a parolee may
he apprehended, but that there are other grounds upon
which a parolee may be "retaken". In it's ruling, the
court stated: "I don't see it as an exclusive procedure."
(T. 13).
Appellant "\Vas properly arrested even though his
arrest was not pursuant to a written order from the
Board of Pardons. (R. 9). Appellant's contentions
cannot be maintained because he has failed to clearly
and convincingly show that the lower court's holding
was in error. See 1'aylor r• . .Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16,
414 P. 2d .575 (1964); Brigham v. llloon Lal..:e Elec.
Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d ::W2, 470 P.2d 393 ( 1970) ; Jlcrn111ott
v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah ::M 356, 453 P.2d 155 (l!W9).
Appellant's cause must fail because he has not met the
hurden of proof which requires that he clearly demonstrate that it was legislature's intention to prevent a
parolee from being retaken without a written order.
Such an interpretation of § 77-62-16 would not be tenable. It would allow a parolee to commit murder and
grevous f elonions crimes in the very presence of an
officer, and yet put the parolee beyond the scope of
arrest until the officer could obtain a written order from
the parolee's board. The District Court's conclusions
were obviously correct.
The Supreme Court of the United States has gone
to great detail in defining probable cause. See Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 306 (1959); Jones v. United
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States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United Stalest'. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 ( HW5); United States v. Ilarris, 402 U.S.
573, 91S.Ct.2075 (1971).
A parolee's freedom must result in the diminution
of his reasonable expectation of privacy, and a diminution of the traditional level of probable cause required
to justify the intrusion of police officers. 'Vhile a
parolee is protected from unreasonable searches, the
starnlards for "unreasonable" are lowered because of his
status. A parolee is subject to a search which would be
impermissible in the ordinary situation because reasonable cause in the case of a parolee is not the same as
reasonable cause in the case of another. See In Re Martinez, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 (1970); United
States v. B'ollctt, 282 F.Supp. 10 (N.Y. 1968); People
'l'. Adams 310 N. Y.S.2d 982 ( 1969); People v. Santos,
298 N.Y.S.2d (1969); People v. LaVallee, 307 N.Y.S.
2d ( 19ti9) ; People v. Gilkey, 6 Cal.App.ad 183, 85 Cal.
Rptr.642 (1970).
There must be a diminution of a parolee's constitutional rights because the granting of parole does not
change h:s statuts. He merely serves the remainder of
the sentence outside rather than inside the prison walls.
The social risks inherent in parole cannot allow a parolee to be a free man, but a ward of the Parole Board
and subject to its control and care. See United States v.
Follett, supra.; People v. Denne, supra. A parolee is
still in legal custody. See People v. Lewis, su]Jl'a.; People
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v. Adams, supra. A prisoner consents to the hoard supervisory and visitorial powers which his parole officer
must exercise by accepting the privilege of parole. Id.
Concerning the arrest of a parolee, People v. Denne,
supra., helcl the following:
"It is unnecessary for a parole officer to apply
for a warrant to "arrest" a parolee who is already his prisoner and who is at all times in
custoria lcgis . .. A parole officer's physical
apprehension of his prisoner for suspected
violation of parole is not an "arrest" in the
sense that a peace officer arrests a private
individual suspected of a crime but a mere
trahsfer of the subject from constructive custody into actual or physical custody." Id. at 458.

Appellant's being taken into custody was properly
authorized because he had clearly violated his parole
agreement. Probable cause was established when he did
not file his monthly report and when his parole officer
could not locate his whereabouts. In United States v.
llill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971), the defendant who
was on probation aroused the officer's suspicions by
looking towards them. The officer's questioned him
and placed him under arrest. The evidence found by
the officers was admissable at the revocation hearing.
The Supreme Court of :l\lontana found probable cause
for the parolee's arrest where he frequented taverns
instead of school. See Petition of Wing, 464 P.2d 302
(1969). People v. Gilkey, supra, found inferential
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circumstances sufficient to take a parolee into custody.
An Ohio court in ,'-,'late 1'. Call, 8 Ohio App.2d 277, 220
N .E.2cl 130 ( H>65), held that a deputy sheriff would
be properly authorized to arrest a parolee upon the
order of a parole officer who had reasonable cause to
believe parole conditions were violated. The facts of
the present case clearly demonstrate probale cause and
lawful arrest.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PAROLE REVOCATION l-IEARING WAS PROPERLY ADl\IITTED.
Given that the "retaking" of appellant was legal
and lawful, it follows that the evidence obtained as a
result of appellant's arrest was entitled to consideration
in the parole revocation hearing. Even in the alternative, where appellant's arrest would not be considered
lawful, the evidence would still be entitled to consideration at the parole revocation hearing.
Attempts to find case atuhority supporting the
notion that illegally seized evidence is inadmissable in
parole revocation hearings have been unsuccessful. See
United States v.
318 F.Supp. 648 at 650 (E.D.
La. 1970).
Heavy case authority allows illegally obtained evidence to be admitted in parole revocation hearings.
Appellant's sole distinguishment in United States v.
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II c7;d, Id, claims that the case is distinguishable because
it deals with probation and not parole violations. This
court held in Baine 'l'.
supra, that there is
really no distinction between probation and parole; but
if the hypothetical distinction were accepted, it would
not be a chtinction favoring appellant's interest in the
present case. United States v. ]1"'ollettc, supra, distinguished probation and parole as follows:
"If there be any difference between one on probation and one on parole, so far as standing
to invoke constitutional rights is concerned,
the difference should favor the one on proThe probationer has never entered prison; the parolee by becoming an inmate of a
prison has thereby certainly lost some constitutional rights, including the protection at
least while in prison against unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. at 13.

In Re 111 artincz, snpra, found that a parole authority may properly consider all the evidence. A reversal of
the conviction would not preclude Adult Authority
from inquiry into the crime in question because the
authority's decision must be predicated upon "parole
behavior" rather than conviction. "ll-Iartinez, concluded
that exclusionary rules are not applicable to parole
.hearings. The court said:
" ... we believe that an agency whose delicate
duty is to decide when a convicted offender
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can he safely allowed to return to and remain
in society is in a different posture than the
court which decides his original guilt. To blind
the authority to relevant facts in this special
context is to incur a risk of danger to the public which, at least as of this date, outweighs
the competing considerations of a problematical gain in deterrence." Id. at 740.
Appellant's attempts to distinguish Jlartinez, are
without merit. The balancing of the interests are presently weighted heavily in favor of the parole system.
See ,'-,'perling v. llitzpatrick, 426 I•'.2d 1161 (2nd Cir.
1970); People v. Denne, :wpra. It is the lawful duty of
appellant's parole officer to have him picked up if his
parole is violated. Any evidence from such arrest may
be used in substantiating parole violations.

People v. H ayko, 7 Cal.App. 3d 671, 86 Cal.Rptr.
726 ( 1970), declared that illegally obtained evidence
was admissible for the limited purpose of determining
probation revocation. See also People v. Denne, supra.;
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, supra. In 1-Iayko, the court
stated:
"The judge is not determining whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of a crime. Rather
he must determine whether the convicted off ender 'can be safely allowed to return to and
remain in society.'" Id. at 730.
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II ayko, would allow the evidence as long as the police
activity invoked did not "shock the conscience". Sperling v. Fitzpatricl..:, supra, at 1164, would allow evidence
from the search of parolees as long as the searches do
not reach the point of harrassment. Jloore v. People,
171 Colo. 338, 467 P .2d 50 ( 1970), held that searches
of prison cells are not unreasonable as long as they
are not conducted for purposes of harrassing or humiliating inmates or in a cruel and unusual manner. See
State v. Brotherton, 2 Or.App. 157, 465 P.2d 749
(1970). A parolee's status is no different from that of
an inmate.
If this court does not sustain the lower court's
decision, the effect will be a strong disruptive influence upon the parole system which will constitute an
endangerment to society. Public interest demands that
this court uphold the decis;on of the lower court. Should
this court not affirm the lower court's decision, legislature would be forced to enact statutes to prevent future
courts from making similar decisions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, appellant was legally
arrested, and the evidence which was taken from that
arrest was properly admitted into evidence during the
hearing of appellant's parole revocation. There are
virtually no on-point cases which support appellant's
position, while there is such strong authority affirming
respondent's position, that the lower court was seeming-
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Jy bound in rendering its decision. Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the lower court be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVIDS. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM: T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

